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The first section of this paper examines the discursive procedure employed by Soc-
rates to subvert common preconceptions of important socio-behavioral notions. The 
point of reference will be the concept of courage which is the main concern in Plato’s 
Laches. The key characteristics of paideia can be exhibited by reconstructing the proce-
dure common sense is subjected to in this example. The second section discusses the 
tremendous influence this pattern of inquiry has had on traditional philosophy. Particu-
lar attention is drawn to the way it confers superiority to philosophers in “pedagogical” 
discourse and to the fact that this privileged stance can by no means be taken for granted 
under present circumstances.  
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The designator “Socrates” refers to a more complicated philosophical figure 
than is usually acknowledged. Plato’s version of the person’s life and discursive 
strategies have had an irreversible impact on philosophy, quite independent 
from how the historical Socrates actually fitted into his contemporary Athenian 
surroundings. Aristophanes counted him among the so-called sophists, precisely 
the group of post-traditional, utilitarian intellectual trainers that Plato took so 
much care to distinguish Socrates from.1 This paper will argue that Aristopha-
nes was not completely wrong about the issue and that his portrayal of the phi-
losopher should rather be taken as indication of an inherent tension, even con-
tradiction, in the “Socratic” enterprise. Platonic paideia, usually presented as  
a blueprint for humanistic (self-)development should, consequently, be consid-
ered within the framework of the educational resources offering social and  
rhetorical skills intended to succeed in an increasingly multifaceted city-state 
like Athens. 
————————— 
1 For an overview of the relationship compare: Woodruff, P. 2006. “Socrates among the  
Sophists.” In: A Companion to Socrates. Ahbel-Rappe, S., R.A. Kamtekar (Eds.). Oxford: Black-
well, 36–47. 
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The argument will focus on a celebrated Socratic move, a strategic device 
designed to startle his interlocutors and to confer an argumentative edge to the 
philosopher. Longstanding familiarity with this stratagem blinds us from notic-
ing a certain trickery in posing one of the most venerable questions in philoso-
phy, namely “What is the essence of X?” An attempt will be made to de-
familiarize the story which has us admiring Socrates’ skills in prompting self-
assured citizens towards a more (pun intended) sophisticated assessment of 
basic philosophical concerns. 
The first section of this paper will examine the discursive procedure em-
ployed by Socrates to subvert common preconceptions of important socio-
behavioral notions. The point of reference will be the concept of courage which 
is the main concern in Plato’s Laches. Key characteristics of paideia can be 
exhibited by reconstructing the procedure commonsense is subjected to in this 
example. The second section will discuss the tremendous influence this pattern 
of inquiry has had on traditional philosophy. Particular attention is drawn to the 
way it confers superiority to philosophers in “pedagogical” discourse and to the 






There is an internet site dedicated to give examples of often used terms, 
among them “courageous.” As “courageous persons,” it lists Anne Frank, 
Charles Lindbergh, Mother Teresa and Sir Edmund Hillary. Courageous actions 
are, according to this proposal:2 
— Trying a food that you’ve never tried before. 
— Asking someone out on a date. 
— Standing up for a person who is being picked upon. 
— Asking for a promotion or a raise at work. 
It is straightforward to find fitting language uses for every item in the list. 
Comparing them to each other, however, raises some problems. What is it, pre-
cisely, that defending a person against an attacker and asking for a pay raise, or 
Anne Frank and Sir Edmund Hillary, share in common? The easy answer is that 
being courageous is quite regularly associated with such behavior or persons. 
But, come to think of it, there is any number of puzzling associations that we 
still find uncontroversial. “The courage of teddies” or “The courageous battle of 
small shops for survival” are phrases we have no trouble understanding, even 
though neither a teddy bear, nor a shop seems to qualify as an example of 
someone showing courage. 
————————— 
2 http://examples.yourdictionary.com/examples/examples-of-courage.html. Accessed 2 July, 
2014. 
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The quandary is, of course, an echo of the story Plato tells about Socrates’ 
encounter with Laches, an Athenian general. Since bravery in war is commonly 
regarded as a good example of courage, Socrates—tongue in cheek—asks him 
for guidance about the use of the term. And when Laches points to one particu-
lar (his favorite) instance of courage, namely fearlessly attacking the enemy in 
open battle, Socrates springs the trap. What about cleverly retreating in order to 
lure the enemy into an ambush? It seems that such a ruse requires just as much 
courage. In other words, a list of examples of possible uses of a term does not 
provide justification for singling out any particular case as an exemplary one. 
We lack an easy answer to the question why Edmund Hillary’s enterprise and 
physical fitness should be on a par with the tragic suffering of Anne Frank. Or, 
in Socratic jargon, we fail to understand what courage really is. 
Now, conventional philosophical discourse is quick to take this lead and to 
make the formula “What is X” an entry point into the distinguished realm of 
“forms” or „essences.” The Platonic Socrates is presented as someone inquiring 
about “the essentials” of several prominent language uses, mainly concerning 
the virtues. But we should, at this point, pause and notice that said formula itself 
is not immune from the sort of treatment Socrates applied to e.g. “courageous.” 
Quite a number of different contexts come to mind. 
— What is this about? 
— What is missing? 
— What is the point of that? 
— What does it matter? 
 
It is by no means clear how somet h i n g  missing is similar to some e ven t  
at a particular place, let alone its me a n in g .  Socrates’ habit to ask embarrass-
ing questions about non-obvious uses of certain terms can very well be turned 
against himself. In this case the legitimacy of asking about a unifying single 
factor underlying diverse episodes qualified as courageous would itself remain  
a matter of dispute. 
Laches could, to put it differently, have remained unimpressed by Socrates’ 
objections, rejecting the suggestion that searching for one paradigm of justice is 
even an acceptable procedure. In fact several of Socrates’ interlocutors are on 
record as not understanding what he was driving at. His disciples h a ve  t o  be  
t a u gh t  how to handle his quest. Its setup and direction is not self-explanatory 
and has to be regarded as a very special ploy, notwithstanding its philosophical 
appeal. The Socrates treatment is, as a matter of fact, the opening move of a 
type of argument that turned out to be indispensable throughout the history of 
Western philosophy. This should, however, not stop us from noticing its affinity 
to some more contentious rhetorical strategies. “What is awaiting you after you 
have died?” or “What will be the rewards for a life virtuously led?” Such ques-
tions work by attempting to explore a terrain unfamiliar to everyday pursuits. 
They are operating with a certain “shock value,” stunning their addressees and 
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preparing them for non-standard answers, usually supplied by the person raising 
the question in the first place. 
It is at this point that the Socratic dialogues share some features with sophist 
teachers. Diogenes Laertius reports the following discursive strategy employed 
by Protagoras: “Furthermore, in his dialectic he neglected the meaning in favor 
of verbal quibbling, and he was the father of the whole tribe of eristical dispu-
tants now so much in evidence.”3 
This description triggers a familiar, judgmental reaction to the effect that, in 
bracketing common sense the sophists prepared the way for artful, yet artificial 
casuistry. But one should recognize that Diogenes Laertius’ description consists 
of two steps, (i) some disregard of established meanings and (ii) some second-
order argumentative rearrangement of conversational items taken out of their 
original context and felt to be formalistic. Now, Socrates’ famous elenchus4 is 
built upon his ability to undermine unscrutinized assumptions and thus “shame” 
or “refute” his agora interlocutors. His outmaneuvering of everyday under-
standing, e.g. in the case of a general’s notion of courage, is closely akin to 
bracketing commonsense. If we assume that this is a sophistic element in ques-
tions of the form “What is X” we are faced with an obvious consequence. Pla-
tonic essences are a product of this reductive methodology. They are a typical 
case of second-level meaning constructs. How can they escape the type of ob-
jections Diogenes Laertius raises against Protagoras? 
The defense of the quest for “forms” (aka “ideas”) cannot rest upon the first, 
negative move which disempowers conventional certainties. Sophistry gets its 
bad name from the backlash of common sense against acrobatic intellectual 
endeavors unleashed by discarding the sensus communis. Plato’s perennial  
accomplishment has been to provide a positive outlook for the second required 
step, namely a proposal of where to go once the familiar terrain is left behind. 
His ideas are dialectically linked to the first-level experiences that are down-
graded by questions about essence. Plato’s success has been to avoid the oppo-
sition directed against the sophists’ exploitation of cognitive brilliance by pro-
posing an attractive account of learning. It is built on the insight that a certain 
educational procedure by necessity starts as a disruptive development. While 
basic skills are acquired in a (more or less) natural way, more advanced compe-
tence and knowledge requires a rejection of the status quo, linked to a more 
worthwhile accomplishment, namely insight into the origin and causes of mere-
ly given facts. 
It has to be noted, though, that the very terminology just used to describe 
Plato’s position is prejudicial in his favor. Plato’s parable of the cave is built 
————————— 
3  Diogenes Laertius. 1925. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Hicks, R. D. (Trans.). 1925. Cam-
bridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Book IX, Chapter VIII, 52.  
4 For a helpful collection of essays on this issue see: Scott, G. A. 2002. Does Socrates Have a 
Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond. University Park: The Penn-
sylvania State University Press. 
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upon the basic dichotomies between darkness and light, down and up, slavery 
and freedom, illusion and insight. Its frame of reference imposes a model of 
individual and social development of considerable conviction. Compared to 
being embedded into local custom, or else to be occupied with refined verbal 
subtleties it was well placed to become the doctrine of civilization, progress and 
enlightenment, whereas anti-Platonism failed to offer a similar “uplifting” nar-
rative. Given the preceding analysis of the Platonic two-step procedure it is, 
however, tempting to offer an alternative assessment of the Socrates treatment. 
Klaus Heinrich, a German philosopher of religion, has put it quite bluntly.5 Pla-
to, according to him, is the most accomplished technocrat of antiquity. This is 
precisely for his synthesis of the counter-intuitive and hyper-intuitive moves. 
Because he strips away a signifier’s familiar context in order to re-integrate it 
into a top-down schematization of the world. Platonic ideas serve as patterns of 
order imposed upon a confusing environment. 
Learning, Plato’s Socrates suggests, does not consist in acquiring ad hoc 
skills and information, but rather in overcoming the limits of localized 
knowledge in order to gain general insights into the forces determining empiri-
cal reality. The process has been advertised as truth-seeking and quest for per-
sonal fulfillment, but it may also be regarded as a magnificent piece of social 
engineering. Socrates’ asking of “What is courage?” is a move to disqualify 
established “wisdom” to make place for a higher-order “form” of courage trans-
cending as well as governing common preconceptions. Gorgias, another sophist, 
is reported to have mounted an Athenian stage and to have offered to answer 
any question whatsoever.6 The Socrates treatment contains an element of this 
sophistic hubris. In positing one form to govern the understanding of its scat-
tered instances he strives for unconditional mastery of the concepts use. 
The procedural mechanics of paideia can be compared to the shifting of 
gears in a car. One has to disconnect from one level of transmission and switch 
to another—more powerful—one, the availability of which has been built into 
the device by its designers. The point is that one has to l o os e  traction to be 
able to regain it one level up and that this is a calculated loss, compensated for 
by the outcome of the successful operation. Bootstrapping, to mention another 
technical procedure, shows a similar logic. It is a bottom-up process and con-
structed so as to hand over control from lower to higher levels of a system. For 
these steps to work a structural hierarchy has to be in place. The power of Pla-
tonic ideas does not reside in some hyper-terrestrial realm but rather in their 
procedural function as part of a progressive dynamic. A dose of sophism is built 
into the engine powering much of Western (philosophy’s) development. 
————————— 
5 Heinrich, K. 1986. Anthropomorphe: Zum Problem des Anthropomorphismus in der Religion-
sphilosophie. Frankfurt/Main: Stroemfeld, 168. 
6 Flavius Philostratos. 2014. Vitae sophistarum, “Preface.” Accessed May 4, 2014. http://goo. 
gl/G2O18E 
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HERE I AM MAN 
 
Paideia has been celebrated as Bildung in German idealism. Its critics like 
Friedrich Nietzsche, on the other hand,7 have pointed at the destructive part of 
the Socratic endeavor. Martin Heidegger, a fierce opponent of German bour-
geois culture, reads Plato’s allegory of the cave as pretty much the beginning of 
technocracy, where reified hierarchical patterns take over from the unfathoma-
ble revelation of truth.8 Rather than delve into his overarching story about the 
history of being we will discuss the Socrates stratagem with reference to a more 
recent critic, Bruno Latour. His account of the Platonic myth fits well into the 
diagnosis of abstraction and sublimation offered in the previous section. He 
notes that the myth is built around a double rupture. The first shift puts a dis-
tance between “the tyranny of social dimension, public life, politics, subjective 
feelings, popular agitation”9 and the realm of truth, whereas the second shift, 
only implicit in our considerations up to now, opens a route back from the sub-
lime to the ordinary existence without which the philosopher’s (or, in Latour’s 
version, the scientist’s) accomplishments will be lost to his compatriots. 
The initial rupture provides the transgressive force of progress, the second 
one ensures that this force remains bound to the resources it broke away from. 
Learning is i mp ro v i n g  a capacity which presupposes possible comparisons 
between its stages. Progress would come to a halt if there was nothing that 
c ou ld  b e  p ro mp te d  to further progress. In Platonic parlance this is the 
problem of methexis or, expressed in terms of the parable, as inexplicable turn-
ing back of the erstwhile prisoner to enlighten the cave dwellers left behind. 
Latour is aware of the fact that, according to the original myth, this is risky 
business. But he points out that it has in fact become a mainstream for a particu-
lar type of actor:  
 
“Although the world of truth differs absolutely, not relatively, from the so-
cial world, the Scientist can go back and forth from one world to the other 
no matter what: the passageway closed to all others is open to him alone. [...]  
The narrow door has become a broad boulevard. In twenty-five centuries, 
however, not thing has not changed in the slightest: the double rupture, 
which the form of the allegory, endlessly repeated, manages to maintain as 
radically as ever.” 10 
 
————————— 
7 Cf. Hart, T. E. (Ed.). 2009. Nietzsche, Culture and Education. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.  
8 Heidegger, M. 1997. Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann.  
9 Latour, B. 2004. Politics of Nature. How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 10.  
10 Latour, B. 2004, op. cit., 11.  
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In drawing attention to this provision in Plato’s fable Latour strengthens the 
case for a technocratic reading of the philosopher’s design. If you start by taking 
away the traditional certitudes available to your interlocutor and sell him on a 
remedy provided by yourself, chances are that this will overrule the initial equi-
librium. But is not the quest for ideas different from the sophist’s training in 
pragmatic rhetoric proficiency? The question is prominent in Plato’s writings 
and deserves a closer look. 
The Platonist’s claim is that there is a difference between putting aside local 
knowledge in order to improve argumentative impact and, on the other hand, to 
gain knowledge on a broader, more exalted scale. It is one thing to be a trainer 
of personal development (for money) and altogether another one to attempt to 
become clear about the governing principles of nature and social life. Granted 
that some affinities between Socrates and the sophists exist, philosophy has 
proven to be quite independent from professional lifestyle guidance and man-
agement counseling. It may on occasion be fashionable to quote Seneca, Spino-
za or Sartre, yet this does not qualify as entering into a prolonged and exacting 
exploration of highly abstract issues having no direct bearing on everyday con-
cerns. It is true that philosophers have to earn a living and are, therefore, de-
pendent on some kind of income, hopefully provided by their philosophical 
activities. But there is a reasonably clear line to be drawn between promoting 
knowledge for a fee and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. It is not 
necessary, for the present purpose, to adhere to a strong version of this argu-
ment. Let us grant that it has a certain prima facie force, comparable to the 
widely respected distinction between editorial content and advertisements, or 
peer review as opposed to predatory publishing.11 What are we to make of the 
firewall standard philosophy has erected between itself and the rule of money? 
This is too big a question, obviously, to be broached on this occasion. We 
can only make an attempt to point into the direction of an answer and, since we 
are began with an illustrative story, we will offer another story, updating the 
former’s intuitions. It starts, in fact, with a center piece of the German tradition 
of Bildung, which inherits and refines the Platonic blueprint. Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe’s Faust is a scholar who has gone through all available curricula 
and remained dissatisfied with what he learned. “What’s worth knowing, I can’t 
say.”12 He is isolated, sitting in his study and despairing of the world, a failed 
teacher: “I can’t say what I should teach / To make men better or convert each.” 
No Socratic confidence is left for this scholar. He is moments before killing 
himself as a heavenly choir rescues him just at the nip of time. It is Easter night 
and the deus ex machina voices celebrate Christ’s resurrection. Bruno Latour’s 
————————— 
11 Cf. http://qcc.libguides.com/predatorypublishing. Accessed May 4, 2014.  
12 Kline, A. S. 2003. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe Faust Parts I & II. Electronic document 
http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/German/Fausthome.htm Scene I, v. 373. Accessed 
May 4, 2014. (Goethe 2003. Kline 2003) 
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first rupture is represented starkly in this episode: no continuity exists between 
ordinary conduct, even including established scholarship, and a realm making 
superior sense of it. 
Goethe’s drama is built upon the premise that Faust’s salvation comes about 
by means of his prolonged and messy dealings with pre-academic „real life.” 
This is made obvious in the immediate sequel to the saving of Faust’s life by the 
super-natural chorus, when he joins the townspeople on an Easter’s walk in 
front of the city-gate. Goethe offers us a glimpse of the chatter of workmen, 
students, soldiers and bourgeois citizens, leaving no doubt about their Epi-
cureian predilections. 
 
“Come to the Castle, you’ll find there 
The prettiest girls, the finest beer, 
And the best place for a fight.”13 
 
This is down-to-earth stuff, precisely the kind of behaviour Faust rejected in 
favor of his study. Yet, as he mingles with the crowd, he exemplifies Latour’s 
second rupture, which point into the opposite direction. Philosophers and scien-
tists in general are supposed to re-enter ordinary circumstances easily. Their 
privilege consists precisely in their capacity to impose their authority, gained by 
knowledge, upon pedestrian pursuits. 
Faust praises the awakening of nature and the consequent festive promenade 
of “the crowd, their feet / Crushing the gardens and meadows”14 and concludes 
his famous monologue with this line: “Hier bin ich Mensch, hier darf ich sein.” 
[Here I am Man: here dare to be.]15 
The speaker is putting this sentence into the mouth of the joyous crowd that 
hails him as its benefactor. Faust’s self-doubts are still manifest but, for the 
moment alleviated by his participation in the spring ritual. The burden of the 
scholar is, in other words, framed by the custom of the land which grounds the 
claim of its inhabitants to “being human,” i.e. to partake in humanity. Goethe is 
pointedly using solemn phrases to accentuate the condition of the crowd. 
“Überall regt sich Bildung und Streben.” 16 Many English translations miss the 
subtle nuances of Bildung and Streben here. Kline renders it as “Change and 
growth are everywhere.”17 The scenario on Easter Sunday is, however, designed 
————————— 
13 Goethe, W. 2003. Faust. See Kline 2003. Scene 2, v. 814ff.  
14 Ibid., v. 930. 
15 Ibid, v. 940. 
16 Ibid., v. 912. 
17 Anna Swanwick has: “Everywhere growth and movement are rife.” Accessed May 4, 2014. 
http://www.bartleby.com/19/1/2.html. Bayard Taylor comes closer to the Platonic subtext but 
his version is akwardly philosophical: “Everywhere form in development moveth.” Accessed 
May 4, 2014. http://archive.org/stream/fausttragedy00goetuoft/fausttragedy00goetuoft_djvu.txt  
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to draw a parallel between the productive forces of nature and society, playing 
on the ambivalence of the German Bildung which can refer to formation (like in 
“the formation of a leave”) or else to (humanistic) education. We are, in Goe-
the’s scenery, offered a view of the prototypical tension between the quest for 
truth and the popular attainment of a satisfactory life, played out between a dis-
gruntled sage and an audience basing its “humanity” on the accord between the 
natural environment and its cultural superstructure. 
Our story, so far, shows the traditional pattern, but it takes a surprising turn 
when we add a contemporary observation. A slight twist of Goethe’s line is 
used in an advertisement for a chain of drug supermarkets. “Hier bin ich 
Mensch, hier darf ichs sein” turns into: “Hier bin ich Mensch, hier kauf ich 
ein.”18 
It is just a clever idea of a certain p.r. campaign, but it may serve a more im-
portant purpose. An almost poetic shift dislodges the scenario of “scholar meets 
common man” and institutes a different paradigm: consumer society. Being 
human, according to this slogan, amounts to take part in the shopping experi-
ence. That does not sound implausible, even though the traditionally minded 
might well by disturbed by this suggestion. Now, if this pronouncement never-
theless touches on the current state of human self-understanding it follows that 
the status of proponents like Socrates and Faust drastically changes. Economic 
well-being is quite removed from the two kinds of rupture Latour has outlined. 
It offers a pragmatic continuum governed by market forces that are, to be sure, 
threatened by their own peculiar breakdowns, but do not thrive on transcending 
circumstances. Enlightenment, or struggling to achieve an equilibrium between 
the quest for humanity’s highest goals and recognition of the modest degree to 
which it informs the life of ordinary citizens, is not on the agenda of homo 
oeconomicus. 
These are well-known and widely discussed developments. They have been 
deplored as a loss of foundation of Western culture, or else welcomed as the 
attainment of an ever-increasing standard of life by mass-media consumerism. 
The question that has been raised at the beginning of this paper is the following 
one: Does this mean that the sophists win and that Socrates-like procedures 
have become obsolete? Should the philosopher stick to its former role as profes-
sor/confessor in the vein of Jacques Derrida19, or should he rather turn to less 
ambitious tasks, e.g. playing a restricted part in multidisciplinary projects in the 
humanities or sciences? These are, admittedly, black-or-white questions that 
would need considerable refinement to enable serious discussion. Yet, one can-
not deny that these stark alternatives are regularly raised in public discourse. 
————————— 
18 “Here I am Man: here do I buy.” Accessed May 4, 2014. 
    http://www.dm-drogeriemarkt.at/at_homepage/unternehmen/grundsaetze/  
19 Cohen, T. (Ed.). 2002. Jacques Derrida and the Humanities. A Critical Reader. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 27–54. 
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(Think of a journalist asking about the importance of philosophy to contempo-
rary society.)  Here is an attempt to satisfy this demand. 
We noted, in describing the Socrates treatment, that it is itself not entirely 
free of sophistry, even though Plato does his best to draw a strict line. Socrates 
springs surprises upon unsuspecting citizens in order to raise attention to his 
concerns and he assembles a number of followers taking his lead. He does not 
do this for money, yet the attention-grabbing procedure and the “technocratic” 
promise to deal with local issues in a more general, top-down way shows him to 
share an important strategic move with his opponents. Philosophical orthodoxy 
has taught for centuries that truth-seeking has to be rigorously distinguished 
from money-making20 and, as a consequence, is scandalized if anyone proposes 
to question this dividing line. It seems that the essence of humanity collapses to 
business matters once this border is transgressed. But should not we question 
this all-or-nothing attitude? 
Philosophy is, as we noted, often done for money, even though its usual 
aims—becoming clear about man’s standing in a natural-cultural cosmos—do 
not lend themselves to payment. Questions of logic or epistemology cannot, in 
an important sense, be answered for a price. The present proposal is to regard 
this as a convention, widely shared and held useful by commonsense. Like the 
distinction between editorial content and advertisement mentioned earlier. Some 
critical feature of public opinion (and consequently of a democratic political 
system) depend on the “division of labor” between investigative journalism and 
propaganda leaflets. We do not, to give another example, have to be in posses-
sion of a rock-solid theory of justice to confidently hold on to the distinction 
between the executive and the judiciary. As both examples show, the lines are 
blurred in many cases, notwithstanding the usual rhetoric about „the free press” 
or “independent courts of law.” Still, we have learned to work on the assump-
tion that these are not distinctions one can (or should) easily discard. They con-
tribute to the distinctive form “our” society has taken. 
A similar argument can be made for the partly subversive, partly overbearing 
practice inherited from Socrates. It does not rest on a timeless division of realms 
of being. Its clear-cut dividing line is a paradigmatic distinction that can, in 
actual circumstances, become difficult to draw. And yet, this is no reason to 
discard the pattern. Radical anti-Platonism might be considered a response to 
the paradigm of the cave, albeit under a more restricted perspective, namely its 
status as t he  o ne  meta-narrative presumably governing human progress. It is 
in the context of this presumption that attacks against Platonic truth want to 
altogether get rid of the picture, provoking the prestige wars known as “over-
coming of metaphysics.” If one is prepared to accept that there is an element of 
sophistry in Socrates’ discursive strategy, the situation, however, may be de-
————————— 
20 Hénaff, M. 2010. The Price of Truth Gift, Money, and Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press. 
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scribed in less dramatic terms. We can come by without raising the prospect of 
cultural Armageddon, by either completely rejecting the parable of the cave, or 
else regarding the Socrates treatment as the last holdout against barbarism. 
Truth, to sum up, does not have to be absolute in order to be binding; and  
a “sophistic” appeal to discursive brilliance and seemingly free-floating defini-
tional detail can be beneficial for society as a whole. This is the lesson to learn 
from Socrates, once we picture him as a thought-provoking individual who 
failed to follow up his provocations with ready-set solutions. And do not forget: 
confounding common sense by pointing towards higher aims is just the kind of 
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